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Michael Fetters, MD, MPH, MA

Faculty

I serve as Professor of Family Medicine, Director of Japanese Family Health Program, and Co-Director of the Michigan Mixed Methods Research and Scholarship Program at the University of Michigan. In addition to being a family/general doctor fluent in Japanese, I have long been interested in the influence of culture on medical decision making and ethics, and have conducted numerous health research projects, and published numerous papers in English and Japanese.

Research Interests: 
Last Name: 
Fetters
Fri, May 08, 2015

Their research was featured in PR Newswire and M Health News.

Research Topics: 

Lisa Harris, MD, PhD

Faculty

Dr. Harris’ research examines issues at the intersection of clinical obstetrical and gynecological care and law, policy, politics, ethics, history, and sociology. She conducts interdisciplinary, mixed methods research on many issues along the reproductive justice continuum, including abortion, miscarriage, contraception, in vitro fertilization (IVF), infertility and birth, and racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in access to reproductive health resources.

Last Name: 
Harris

Reshma Jagsi, MD, DPhil

Director

Reshma Jagsi, MD, DPhil, is Professor, Deputy Chair, and Residency Program Director in the Department of Radiation Oncology and Director of the Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine at the University of Michigan.

She graduated first in her class from Harvard College and then pursued her medical training at Harvard Medical School. She also served as a fellow in the Center for Ethics at Harvard University and completed her doctorate in Social Policy at Oxford University as a Marshall Scholar.

Last Name: 
Jagsi
Research Projects: 
Press Coverage: 

Christian Vercler, MD, MA

Faculty

Christian Vercler is a Clinical Associate Professor of Pediatric Plastic Surgery at the University of Michigan C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital. He is a service chief of the Clinical Ethics Service in the Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine (CBSSM). Dr. Vercler has a special interest in ethics in surgery and he holds master's degrees in both Theology and Bioethics. He has a passion for teaching medical students and residents and has won teaching awards from Emory University Medical School, Harvard Medical School, and the University of Michigan.

Last Name: 
Vercler

Is your well-being influenced by the guy sitting next to you? (Nov-03)

Rating your satisfaction with your life may not be a completely personal decision. See how your satisfaction rating may be influenced by others.

When answering this question, imagine that there is someone in a wheelchair sitting next to you. They will also be answering this question, but you will not have to share your answers with each other.

How satisfied are you with your life in general?

Extremely satisfied 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 Not at all satisfied

How do you compare to the people surveyed?

You gave your life satisfaction a rating of 1, which means that you are extremely satisfied with your life. In a study done where people with a disabled person sitting next to them wrote down their life satisfaction on a questionnaire, they gave an average life satisfaction rating of 2.4, which means they were very satisfied with their lives.

What if you'd had to report your well-being to another person instead of writing it down?

In the study, half the people had to report their well-being in an interview with a confederate (a member of the research team who was posing as another participant). When the participants had to report in this way, and the confederate was not disabled, the participants rated their well-being as significantly better than those who reported by writing it on the questionnaire in the presence of a non-disabled confederate (2.0 vs. 3.4, lower score means higher well-being). The scores given when reporting to a disabled confederate elicited a well-being score that was no different than that when completing the questionnaire in the presence of a disabled confederate (2.3 vs. 2.4).

Mean life satisfaction ratings, lower score means higher satisfaction
Mode of rating well-being Disabled confederate Non-disabled Confederate
Interview (public) 2.3 2.0
Questionnaire (private) 2.4 3.4
What caused the difference in well-being scores?

When making judgments of well-being, people (at least in this study) tend to compare themselves to those around them. This effect is seen more when well-being was reported in an interview than when the score was privately written down, due to self-presentation concerns. A higher rating was given in public so as to appear to be better off than one may truly feel. Note that the effect was only seen in the case where the confederate was not disabled. While well-being ratings were better overall with a disabled confederate, there was no difference between the private and public ratings. Social comparison led to a better well-being judgment, but it appears that the participants were hesitant to rate themselves too highly in front of the disabled person for fear of making the disabled person feel worse.

Why is this important?

Subjective well-being is a commonly used measure in many areas of research. For example, it is used as one way to look at the effectiveness new surgeries or medications. The above studies show that SWB scores can vary depending on the conditions under which they are given. Someone may give a response of fairly high SWB if they are interviewed before leaving the hospital, surrounded by people more sick than they are. From this, it would appear as though their treatment worked great. But suppose that they are asked to complete a follow-up internet survey a week later. Since they do not have to respond to an actual person face-to-face, and without being surrounded by sick people, they may give a lower rating than previously. Is this because the treatment actually made their SWB worse over the longer term, or simply because a different method was used to get their response? The only way to really know would be to use the same methodology to get all their responses, which might not always be feasible. These are important considerations for researchers to keep in mind when analyzing results of their studies. Are the results they got the true SWB of their participants, or is it an artifact of how the study was done? And is there a way to know which measure is right, or are they both right which would lead to the conclusion that SWB is purely a momentary judgment based on a social context?

For more information see:

Strack F, Schwarz N, Chassein B, Kern D, Wagner D. Salience of comparison standards and the activation of social norms: Consequences for judgements of happiness and their communication. British Journal of Social Psychology. 29:303-314, 1990.

What is the price of life? (Aug-03)

Do you think that your life is worth more than the amount that the government usually uses as the maximum to spend to provide one year of life?

Imagine that you are a member of a government panel that is trying to decide how cost-effective a medical treatment must be in order for the government to cover the costs of the treatment. Suppose that a certain treatment could provide one additional year of life to an otherwise healthy person. What is the highest amount the government should be willing to pay per person for this treatment?

How do your answers compare?

For the past twenty years, the figure most often used as the maximum amount to spend to provide one year of life has been $50,000. This figure was originally proposed since it was the cost of a year of kidney dialysis, a lifesaving treatment that the U.S. government funds in Medicare.

Should the number be higher or lower than the current standard?

Conventional wisdom would suggest that the number be higher to take into account the inflation that has occurred in the years since the standard was developed. Current practices such as annual Pap smear screening for women with low risk for cervical cancer, which has a cost of $700,000 per year of life gained, also suggest that society is willing to pay more than the current standard for a year of life. The authors of the cited article recommend, based on current treatment practices and surveys of the general public, that the cost-effectiveness threshold should be revised to be around $200,000.

Should the number increase, decrease, or stay the same over time?

Again, it seems that the threshold amount should increase over time due to inflation. However, other factors come in to play that affect the value.

Since new technologies are emerging all the time, some of which will be deemed cost-effective, there will be more and more treatments to be offered in the future. Also, the rate of use of treatments is an important consideration, because even if a new treatment is more cost-effective than an old one, if it is used more often it will end up costing more to society overall. With more treatments becoming available and more people being given treatments, the threshold cost will probably have to decrease so that insurance companies and the government can keep up with the increasing availability and demand.

Why is this important?

Insurance companies and government health care entities face a continuing struggle when trying to determine which medical treatments to cover. Health care costs are increasing rapidly, so these groups will be facing even tougher decisions in the future. Establishing cost-effectiveness guidelines would be extremely helpful as an aid to making the decisions about treatment coverage. Evidence shows that the current threshold is probably not an accurate reflection of the desires of society or actual prescribing practices. It needs to be adjusted to become useful once again, and must be reevaluated periodically to make sure the value keeps up with trends in the health care market, rather than being left alone without question for two decades as is the current situation.

For more information see:

Ubel PA, Hirth RA, Chernew ME, Fendrick AM. What is the price of life and why doesn't it increase at the rate of inflation? Archives of Internal Medicine. 163:1637-1641, 2003.

Is Bill Gates' time worth more than yours? (Jul-03)

Informal caregiving for relatives (parents, grandparents, spouses) can be time consuming. Can we attach dollar value to that time? Is everyone's time worth the same amount?

Imagine that your mother is suffering from moderate dementia and needs assistance with daily activities such as bathing and dressing. You are the only person available to care for her, as you are an only child and your father has passed away. On average, your mother will need about 2 to 3 hours of help per day, or 17 hours per week total.

Assuming that you provide 17 hours of care per week, that means you will provide about 900 hours of care each year. How much money would you say the time you devote to caregiving is worth each year?
 
Now imagine that Bill Gates, the world's richest person, is in the same situation as you. He has to provide 17 hours of care per week to his mother. How do you think the value of the time he spends giving care compares to the value of the time you spend giving care?
 
  • His is worth more
  • His is worth the same amount
  • His is worth less

How do your answers compare?

According to a study done to determine the costs of informal caregiving, the average value of the time spent giving care to someone with moderate dementia was about $7400. This was calculated using an average time of about 900 hours per year, at the mean wage for a home health aide in 1998 of $8.20 per hour.

What if the person you're caring for has less or more severe dementia?

As you might imagine, the cost of informal care differs depending on the severity of dementia. People with mild dementia don't need as much care (8.5 hours per week), and those with severe dementia need much more (41.5 hours per week). The amount of care needed directly impacts the estimated cost of care:

Dementia severity Hours of care per week Estimated cost of informal care
Mild 8.5 $3630
Moderate 17.4 $7420
Severe 41.5 $17,700
Why is this important?

As the Baby Boomer generation ages, the number of people needing informal care is going to increase dramatically. In order to make informed policy decisions regarding care for older people, the government will need an estimate of the value of informal care. A major obstacle to this is that there is no set way for making the estimates.

Earlier, you said that Bill Gate's caregiving time would be worth the same amount as yours. That implies that basing national estimates of caregiving costs on average wages would be the proper way to go about the calculations, since it means everyone's time is equally valuable.

However, some people think that not everyone's time is of equal value. In that case, using average wages to estimate the total cost of caregiving may not lead to an accurate representation. If one group of people is more likely to provide care than another group, then the average value of all caregivers' time may not be the same as the average of all peoples' time. This would possibly lead to an over- or underestimation of caregiving costs, depending on the value of the time of common groups of caregivers. Even without an agreed-upon estimation method, some valuable data can be generated.

The estimation method used in this study likely led to conservative figures, so the true costs of informal caregiving are probably higher than reported here. Even using this conservative method, the costs to society are staggering. The researchers estimated that the cost of informal caregiving for dementia alone in 1998 was $18.6 billion, which is almost two-thirds as much money as that actually spent on paid home care services for all conditions, not just dementia! That figure will grow considerably in the not-so-distant future when the Baby Boomers begin to need caregiving, whether formal or informal, and will likely have a large impact not just on health care systems, but on society as a whole as more and more people are called on to provide informal care.

For more information see:

Langa KM, et al. National estimates of the quantity and cost of informal caregiving for the elderly with dementia. Journal of General Internal Medicine. 16:770-778, 2001.

Supporting information for: 2017 CBSSM Research Colloquium and Bishop Lecture (Norman Daniels, PhD)


"Setting priorities for Medicaid: The views of minority and underserved communities"
Presenter: Susan Goold, MD, MHSA, MA


Co-authors: Lisa Szymecko, JD, PhD; H. Myra Kim, ScD; Cengiz Salman, MA; A. Mark Fendrick, MD; Edith Kieffer, MPH, PhD; Marion Danis, MD, Zachary Rowe, BBA


Setting priorities for state Medicaid programs challenges policy makers. Engaging beneficiaries affected by tradeoffs could make allocations more just and more sensitive to their needs. 

Academic-community partnerships adapted the simulation exercise CHAT (CHoosing All Together) to engage community members in deliberations about Medicaid spending priorities.  After an informational video about Medicaid, individuals and deliberating groups choose from a menu of spending options constrained by limited resources. We randomly assigned participants from low-income communities throughout Michigan to participate in CHAT with (n=209) or without group deliberations (n=181) in English, Spanish or Arabic. Data collection included pre- and post-CHAT individual priorities and group priorities.

Low-income participants ranged from 18 to 81 years old (Mean 48.3); 61.6% were women. Over half (56.7%) self-identified as white, 30.8% African-American, 17.3% Hispanic, 9.2% Native American, and 12.1% Arab, Arab-American or Chaldean. Most (65.9%) had a chronic condition and 30.3% reported poor or fair health.

Before CHAT, most participants prioritized eligibility consistent with Medicaid expansion. They also prioritized coverage for a broad range of services. Most accepted daily copays for elective hospitalization (71.6% deliberators, 67.9% controls) and restricted access to specialists (60.2% deliberators, 57.4% controls). Deliberators were more likely than controls to increase, after deliberations, what they allocated to mental health care (between arm difference in allocation=0.22, p=.03) and eligibility (between arm difference in allocation=0.18, p=.04). Deliberating groups also prioritized eligibility; only 3 of 22 chose pre-expansion eligibility criteria, and 9 of 22 chose to expand eligibility further.

Members of underserved communities in Michigan put a high priority on Medicaid expansion and broad coverage. When given the opportunity to deliberate about priorities,  participants increased the priority given to expanded eligibility and coverage for mental health services.


"How Acceptable Is Paternalism? A Survey-Based Study of Clinician and Non-clinician Opinions on Decision Making After Life Threatening Stroke"
Presenter: Kunal Bailoor, MD Candidate


Co-authors: Chithra Perumalswami, MD, MSc; Andrew Shuman, MD; Raymond De Vries, PhD; Darin Zahuranec, MD, MS


Complex medical scenarios may benefit from a more paternalistic model of decision making. Yet, clinicians are taught to value patient autonomy, especially at the end-of-life. Little empirical data exist exploring opinions on paternalism.

Methods: A vignette-based survey exploring surrogate decision making after hemorrhagic stroke was administered to clinicians (faculty, residents, and nurses) at an academic health center, and non-clinicians recruited through a university research volunteer website. The cases involved an urgent decision about brain surgery, and a non-urgent decision about continuation of life support one week after stroke. Respondents rated the acceptability of paternalistic decision making, including clinicians not offering or making an explicit recommendation against the treatment, on a 4 point Likert scale.

Results: Of 924 eligible individuals, 818 (649 non-clinicians, 169 clinicians) completed the survey (completion rate 89%).  A minority of respondents (15.3%) found it acceptable not to offer surgery. Most believed it was acceptable to make an explicit recommendation that would likely result in death (73% for avoiding surgery, 69% for stopping the ventilator). Clinicians were more likely than non-clinicians to consider not offering surgery acceptable (30% vs 11%, p<0.0001). Clinicians were more likely to consider recommendations against surgery acceptable (82% vs 71%, p=0.003) and to consider recommendations to discontinue the ventilator acceptable (77% vs 67%, p=0.02). There were no differences between the nurse and physician acceptability ratings (p=0.92).

Conclusions: Clinicians and the lay public differ on the acceptability of paternalistic decision making. Understanding these differences are vital to improving communication between clinicians, patients, and families.


"Ethical Challenges Faced by Providers in Pediatric Death: A Qualitative Thematic Analysis"
Presenter: Stephanie Kukora, MD


Co-authors: Janice Firn, PhD, MSW; Patricia Keefer, MD; Naomi Laventhal, MD, MA
 

Background: Care providers of critically ill patients encounter ethically complex and morally distressing situations in practice. Though ethics committees guide ethical decision-making when conflicts arise in challenging cases, they rarely address routine needs of individual providers. Without ethics education, providers may lack skills necessary to resolve these conflicts or insight to recognize these dilemmas.

Objective: We sought to identify whether providers remark on ethical dilemmas/moral distress without being specifically prompted, when asked to comment on a recent in-hospital pediatric death. We also sought to characterize the nature of dilemmas or distress if found.

Methods: Providers involved in a deceased child’s care in the 24 hours prior to death were electronically surveyed. Questions included demographic information and free-text response. Free-text responses were thematically analyzed in Dedoose.

Results: There were 307 (35%) free-text responses in 879 completed surveys (33% total response rate), regarding the deaths of 138 patients (81% of in-hospital pediatric deaths) from November 2014 to May 2016. Multidisciplinary care team members from diverse hospital units were represented. 52 respondents described ethical challenges and/or moral distress. Disagreement/regret was a major theme, with subthemes of futility, suffering, and “wrong” medical choice made. Failure of shared decision-making was also a major theme, with subthemes of autonomy and best interest, false hope, denial, and misunderstanding/disagreement between the family and medical team. Some providers revealed personal ethical struggles pertaining to their role, including medication provision for pain at the end of life, struggling to be “truthful” while not divulging information inappropriate for their role, and determining when providing comfort care is ethically permissible.

Discussion/Conclusion: Providers experience ethical conflicts with pediatric end-of-life care but may be unwilling or unable to share them candidly. Education assisting staff in identifying and resolving these dilemmas may be helpful. Further support for providers to debrief safely, without criticism or repercussions, may be warranted.


"Capacity for Preferences:  An overlooked criterion for resolving ethical dilemmas with incapacitated patients"
Presenters: Jason Adam Wasserman, PhD; Mark Navin, PhD
 

Clinical bioethics traditionally recognizes a hierarchy of procedural standards for determining a patient’s best plan of care. In broad terms, priority is given first to autonomous patients themselves and then to surrogates who utilize substituted judgments to choose as they believe the patient would have chosen. In the absence of good information about what the patient would have wanted, clinical ethicists typically retreat to the “best interest” standard, which represents a relatively objective assessment designed to maximize benefits and/or minimize harms.  In this paper, we argue that “capacity for preferences” is a conceptually distinct and morally salient procedural standard for determining a patient’s best plan of care.  We build our argument on the grounds that 1) that many patients who lack decisional capacity can nevertheless reliably express preferences (an empirical claim); 2) these preferences are distinct from best interest and not reducible to best interest considerations; 3) that capacity for preferences, at a minimum, has moral valence for situations in which best interest is undetermined (and we argue this happens more frequently than commonly recognized); and, finally, 4) that capacity for preferences in incapacitated patients lacking reliable or valid surrogates might even subvert a best interest course of action in some cases.  Some precedent for our analysis can be found in the concept of pediatric assent. However, the idea that patient preferences matter morally has broad application for adult patients, including for those with advanced dementia and other mental illnesses that preclude capacity for decision-making.

Ken Langa, MD, PhD

Faculty

Dr. Langa is the Cyrus Sturgis Professor in the Department of Internal Medicine and Institute for Social Research, a Research Scientist in the Veterans Affairs Center for Clinical Management Research, and an Associate Director of the Institute of Gerontology, all at the University of Michigan. He is also Associate Director of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a National Institute on Aging funded longitudinal study of 20,000 adults in the United States ( http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu ).

Last Name: 
Langa

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